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We study the robustness of quantum key distribution protocols using discrete or continuous variables to the
channel noise. We introduce the model of such noise based on coupling of the signal to a thermal reservoir,
typical for continuous-variable quantum key distribution, to the discrete-variable case. Then we perform a
comparison of the bounds on the tolerable channel noise between these two kinds of protocols using the same
noise parametrization, in the case of implementation which is perfect otherwise. Obtained results show that
continuous-variable protocols can exhibit similar robustness to the channel noise when the transmittance of
the channel is relatively high. However, for strong loss discrete-variable protocols are superior and can over-
come even the infinite-squeezing continuous-variable protocol while using limited nonclassical resources. The
requirement on the probability of a single-photon production which would have to be fulfilled by a practical
source of photons in order to demonstrate such superiority is feasible thanks to the recent rapid development in
this field.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the method of sharing
a secret key between two trusted parties using nonclassical
properties of quantum states. This enables the security of
the key based on physical principles contrary to the mathe-
matical complexity in the classical cryptographic protocols.
The first QKD protocols were suggested on the basis of single
photons [1] or entangled photon pairs [2] and, respectively,
photon-counting measurements. The key bits were encoded
to and obtained from the measurement of the states with the
discrete spectrum and so the protocols were later referred to as
discrete-variable (DV). Alternatively, schemes utilizing multi-
photon quantum states of light and encoding the key using ob-
servables with the continuous spectrum [3] were suggested on
the basis of Gaussian modulation [4] of squeezed [5] or coher-
ent [6, 7] states and homodyne detection, and are referred to as
continuous-variable (CV) QKD protocols. Both these families
of protocols were successfully implemented [8–12] and their
security was analyzed with respect to individual [13, 14], col-
lective [15, 16] or the most effective coherent attacks [17, 18],
also taking into account the effects of finite data ensemble size
[19–21].
The applicability of all QKD protocols is limited by the im-
perfections of the devices used to prepare and measure quan-
tum states and also by the properties of quantum channels,
which are inclined to losses and noise [22–24]. While it is
important to understand which kind of protocols may be ad-
vantageous in specific conditions, at present there are no sim-
ple criteria for choosing either of their families for a particular
task. The main reason for this is that making a fair comparison
between DV and CV QKD protocols is hard due to the relativ-
ity of practical conditions and even different physical mech-
anisms leading to imperfections in the devices typically used
in the protocol implementations. The only attempt to compare
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the performance of DV and CV systems done so far concerned
the measurement-device independent systems and discussed
practical conditions which can strongly vary depending on the
wavelength, types of sources, channels and detectors being
used, and set of optimistic or pessimistic assumptions being
made about the possibility of an eavesdropper to attack the
devices [25]. In our work we limit the discussion of realistic
implementations of DV and CV schemes to a minimum. We
mainly focus our attention on comparing the robustness of dif-
ferent types of protocols to the channel noise in the otherwise
perfect set-ups. Later, we consider only finite nonclassical re-
sources, i.e. quality of single-photon states and finite amount
of quadrature squeezing.
Including the problem of channel noise in the QKD se-
curity analysis is more typical for the CV case. While it is
well known that CV protocols can tolerate ideally any level of
channel losses, the excess channel noise can be very harmful
and even break the security of these protocols making QKD
impossible. It can be considered as a main threat for their se-
curity. Indeed, the Gaussian excess noise, which is typically
assumed in the CV QKD following the optimality of Gaussian
collective attacks [16], can break the security at the values be-
low a shot-noise unit for a lossless channel and is further en-
forced by the channel losses [10–12].
On the other hand, the analyses of DV QKD protocols
performed so far usually focused on different setup imper-
fections, specifically multiphoton pulses and detection noise,
which seem to be the main threats for security in this field.
Even if various types of channel noise, originating e.g. from
birefringence effect present in optical fibers, inhomogeneity
of the atmosphere, changes of temperature or background
light were sometimes included in these investigations [26],
they were usually described in a very simplified way, typically
by using a single constant parameter, estimation of which
could be made experimentally for a given, specific setup. This
is especially true for the analyses of free-space DV QKD con-
sidering background light, arriving at Bob’s detectors from
other sources than the one used by Alice [27]. Disturbances
2of the states of photons traveling through a given quantum
channel in the case of fiber-based QKD schemes were typi-
cally treated in a similar way, basing on the assumption that
although these kind of effects can generally vary in time, the
variations can be considered to be very slow comparing to
the time needed for a single photon to propagate from Alice
to Bob [26]. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that in
short periods of time channel noise affects all of the travel-
ing photons in the same way and can be described by a sin-
gle, constant parameter. Such noise, called collective, was
analyzed in many articles and a lot of possible countermea-
sures against it have been proposed, utilizing e.g. Faraday
mirrors [28], decoherence-free subspaces [29], quantum error-
rejection codes [30], dense coding [31] or entanglement swap-
ping [32]. However, no detailed analysis of the relationships
between the transmittance of the channel connecting Alice
and Bob, and the amount of tolerable channel noise has been
presented so far and the influence of this relationship on the
security of DV QKD protocols has never been analyzed, at
least to our knowledge. At the same time due to the continu-
ous improvement of realistic single-photon sources and detec-
tors taking place nowadays, this issue gradually gains impor-
tance, especially since the links connecting Alice and Bob in
commercial QKD applications may be more noisy than in the
typical quantum-optical laboratories [33, 34].
In this paper we use in the DV protocols the model for ex-
cess channel noise basing on a typical model for CV QKD
configuration. We analyze the security bound on such noise
for both of these two cases under the assumption that Al-
ice’s sources and Bob’s detection systems are perfect. Fur-
thermore, we check the stability of the obtained results to
the decreasing number of quantum signals exchanged by the
trusted parties during the protocol in the finite-key regime. We
also compare lower bounds on the secure key rate for the two
schemes and find requirements for the nonclassicality of re-
sources needed for their realistic implementations. For the
case of ideal sources and detectors our study shows that while
CV protocols can successfully compete with DV schemes
when the channel transmittance is relatively high, the latter
are superior than the former ones for long-distance channels.
In this situation it turns out to be possible for DV protocols
to beat infinite-squeezing CV schemes even when using real-
istic single-photon sources. The requirements on the quality
of pulses produced by such sources, which would be needed
in order to demonstrate this superiority in practice, turn out to
be high but reachable by the current technology. For the ther-
mal sources of noise with mean number of photons produced
per pulse higher than 10−4 overcomingCV protocolswith DV
schemes can be possible only by using single-photon sources
with at least 50% probability of producing a non-empty pulse
and negligible probability of multiphoton emission.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we describe the
models for excess channel noise used in our analysis: first a
standard model for CV QKD case and subsequently the anal-
ogous model for DV QKD case. We also derive there all the
necessary formulae needed for assessing the security of Gaus-
sian squeezed-state, BB84 and six-state protocols. Next, in
Sec. III we numerically compare the maximal secure values
of the channel noise that these protocols can tolerate on the
transmittance of the channel connecting Alice and Bob in the
case of perfect source and detection system. The comparison
is done both in the asymptotic and the finite-key regimes. We
also present analytical expressions approximating the maxi-
mal tolerable channel noise for DV and CV protocols in the
limit of very low transmittance. More realistic situation is an-
alyzed in Sec. IV, where we investigate how the quality of Al-
ice’s source may influence the security of our models. Finally,
Sec.V concludes our work.
II. MODELS FOR THE CHANNEL NOISE IN QKD
To assess the security of DV and CV QKD protocols we
estimate the lower bound on the secure key rate per one pulse
emitted by Alice’s source. In the DV case this quantity can be
expressed as [35]
K(DV ) = pexp∆I, (1)
where pexp denotes the probability for Bob to get a click in
his detection system per pulse produced by the source and
∆I is the so-called secret fraction. Following the quantum
generalization of the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner theorem [36] performed
by Devetak and Winter [37], this quantity reads
∆I = max[0, IAB −min {IEA, IEB}], (2)
where IAB is the mutual information between Alice and Bob
and IEA (IEB) represents the amount of information Eve can
gain on Alice’s (Bob’s) data upon an eavesdropping attack.
On the other hand in the case of CV QKD protocols the lower
bound on the secure key rate can be written simply as
K(CV ) = ∆I, (3)
since, contrary to the DV case, all of the pulses emitted by
Alice’s source are registered by Bob’s detection system in this
situation. Generally speaking both the formulae (1) and (3)
should also contain the so-called sifting probability, represent-
ing the chance for the chosen settings of Bob’s measurement
setup to be compatible with a given signal sent by Alice. How-
ever, in the theoretical, asymptotic case, in which we assume
that the key produced by Alice and Bob is infinitely long, its
generation rate can be increased without compromising its se-
curity by performing highly asymmetric version of a given DV
or CV protocol, making the sifting probability arbitrary close
to one [35, 38].
While the methods of calculating the lower bound on the se-
cure key rate (2) are substantially different in the DV and CV
QKD, as we discuss in the following subsections, we develop
the model of noise which can be applied to both these fami-
lies of protocols using the same parametrization. The model is
based on coupling every signal mode to an independent ther-
mal reservoir with the coupling ratio T , which corresponds to
the channel transmittance, and with the reservoirs being char-
acterized by the mean number of thermal photons µ emitted
per pulse. We study robustness of the DV and CV protocols
3to such thermal noise and derive and compare the security
bounds in terms of the maximum tolerable mean numbers of
noise photons.
A. Channel noise in CV QKD
CV QKD protocols typically use Gaussian states of light
and respectively Gaussian modulation, which are compatible
with the extremality of Gaussian states [39] and enable the se-
curity proofs against optimal Gaussian collective attacks [16].
In our study we consider the Gaussian squeezed-state proto-
col based on the quadrature modulation and homodyne detec-
tion [5]. The reason why we choose this scheme instead of
the more popular GG02 protocol [6] is that the squeezed-state
protocol is more resistant to the channel noise than GG02.
This conclusion can be confirmed by comparing the results
of our analysis performed for the squeezed-state protocol,
presented in Sec. III, with the analogous results obtained for
the GG02 scheme, shown in the Appendix A. Moreover, the
squeezed-state protocol is the best known Gaussian CV QKD
protocol in terms of the resistance to the channel noise [11].
Hence, demonstration of its inferiority to the DV protocols in
that regard, shown in Sec. III, automatically implies that also
other existing Gaussian CV QKD protocols cannot compete
with the DV schemes.
The squeezed-state protocol was shown to be secure against
collective [16] and subsequently against general attacks [40]
in the asymptotic limit and against the collective attacks in the
finite-size regime [21]. In our analysis we assume that i) Al-
ice uses a perfect source of quadrature-squeezed states with a
quadrature variance 1/V ≪ 1 and that ii) Bob’s homodyne
detection is perfect with a unity efficiency and no uncontrol-
lable noise. The scheme of the protocol, illustrated in Fig. 1,
is based on the squeezed signal state preparation by Alice us-
ing an optical parametric oscillator (OPO), phase/amplitude
quadrature modulation based on the random Gaussian dis-
placements applied in the modulator (M), and transmission
along with the local oscillator (LO), being a phase reference
for the homodyne measurement, through the Gaussian lossy
and noisy channel. The remote party (Bob) splits the signal
from the LO and performs homodyne measurement on the
squeezed and modulated quadrature. The parties should swap
between the bases (i.e. squeezing and modulating either of
the two complementary quadratures) in order to perform the
channel estimation, but in the following we assume that the
channel estimation is perfect.
We now use Gaussian asymptotic security analysis to esti-
mate the security bounds on the CV QKD protocols. To do so,
following the Gaussian security proofs, we calculate the lower
bound on the secure key rate in the reverse reconciliation sce-
nario, which is known to be more robust against channel loss
[9] and being no less sensitive to the channel noise:
K(CV ) = max[0, IAB − χBE ], (4)
where IAB is the mutual information shared between the
trusted parties, and χBE is the Holevo bound [41], upper lim-
iting the information available to an eavesdropper from a col-
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FIG. 1. (color online) CV QKD scheme with lossy and noisy quan-
tum channel connecting Alice and Bob. The following abbreviations
were used in this picture: OPO – optical parametric oscillator, M
– amplitude/phase quadrature modulator, PBS – polarization beam-
splitter, LO - local oscillator.
lective attack in a given channel. To analyze the security of
CVQKDwe switch to the equivalent entanglement-based rep-
resentation [14] so that Alice and Bob measure a two-mode
entangled state shared between them through a quantum chan-
nel. The covariance matrix of the state is then given by
γAB =
(
V I
√
T
√
V 2 − 1σz√
T
√
V 2 − 1σz [V T + (1 − T )W ]I
)
, (5)
where the diagonal matrix I = diag(1, 1), σz = diag(1,−1)
is the Pauli matrix, V is the variance of the modulated
squeezed signal states, and W = 2µ + 1 is the quadrature
variance of the thermal noise state. The mutual information
between the trusted parties then reads
IAB =
1
2
log2
V +W ′
1/V +W ′
, (6)
whereW ′ =W (1−T )/T . Following the pessimistic assump-
tion that Eve is able to purify all the noise added to the signal,
we estimate the Holevo bound as χBE = S(AB) − S(A|B)
through the quantum (von Neumann) entropies S(AB) de-
rived from the symplectic eigenvalues [4] λ1,2 of the state
described by the covariance matrix (5), and S(A|B) derived
from the symplectic eigenvalue λ3 of the state conditioned on
Bob’s measurement and described by the covariance matrix
γA|B = γA − σAB(XγBX)MPσTAB , (7)
where γA = diag(V, V ), γB = diag([V T + (1 −
T )W ], [V T + (1 − T )W ]) are the matrices, describing the
modes A and B individually; σAB =
√
T (V 2 − 1)σz is the
matrix, which characterizes correlations between the modes
A and B, all being submatrices of (5). MP stands for Moore-
Penrose inverse of a matrix (also known as pseudoinverse ap-
plicable to the singular matrices), and X = diag(1, 0). Here
with no loss of generality we assume that the x-quadrature is
measured by Bob. Now the Holevo bound can be directly cal-
culated as
χBE = G
(
λ1 − 1
2
)
+G
(
λ2 − 1
2
)
−G
(
λ3 − 1
2
)
, (8)
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FIG. 2. (color online) Our model for DVQKD scheme with lossy and
noisy quantum channel connecting Alice and Bob. The following
abbreviations were used in this picture: SPS – single-photon source,
PBS – polarization beam-splitter.
which together with the mutual information (6) gives the
lower bound on the secure key rate (4). Here G(x) =
(x + 1) log2 (x+ 1) − x log2 x is the bosonic entropic func-
tion [42]. The bounds on the channel noise, characterized by
µ, are then derived by turning the secure key rate (4) to zero.
We also consider the extension of the protocol, when trusted
noise is added on the detection stage to improve the robustness
of the protocol to the channel noise [24] (note that the het-
erodyne detection can be seen as the particular case of such
noise addition and therefore was not considered in our study).
This provides the maximum tolerable channel noise for a per-
fect CV QKD protocol with a given squeezing 1/V and upon
given channel transmittance T .
B. Channel noise in DV QKD
Alternatively to the above-described CV scheme we con-
sider the use of polarization-based BB84 [1] and six-state [43]
protocols, both belonging to the family of DV protocols, to
generate secure key by Alice and Bob. The scheme which
we analyze is illustrated in Fig. 2. We assume that i) Alice’s
source is a perfect single-photon source and ii) Bob uses per-
fect single-photon detectors with no dark counts and unity ef-
ficiency. Our basic assumption on these detectors is that they
do not have the ability to resolve the number of incoming pho-
tons. However, in the Appendix B we analyze also the oppo-
site possibility for the comparison. Since Alice’s source is
perfect, it never emits multiphoton pulses and Eve cannot per-
form photon-number-splitting attacks on the signal pulses. If
so, Alice and Bob cannot gain anything by using decoy-pulse
method [44] and we do not consider it in our analysis.
In the model presented in Fig. 2 the channel noise, coupled
to the signal during its propagation between Alice and Bob,
is generated in two orthogonal polarizations by two indepen-
dent sources of thermal noise. In fact this model is completely
analogous to the one analyzed in Sec. II A, where two polar-
ization modes are used to transmit the signal and the local
oscillator. Since the effect of this noise on the bright local
oscillator is negligible, it is not considered in the CV case.
We assume here that the photons emitted by a given source
of noise have the same polarization as signal photons trans-
mitted through the channel to which it is coupled. We denote
the probability of emitting n noise photons by a given source
by pn(µ), where µ is the mean number of noise photons pro-
duced per pulse. For thermal noise this probability is given
by
pn(µ) =
µn
(µ+ 1)n+1
. (9)
Similarly to the CV case we assume that Eve fully controls
the noise coupled to the signal in the quantum channel. There-
fore, she can perform any attack which produces the same
QBER as would be obtained by the trusted parties if there
was no eavesdropper. We assume here that Eve executes the
general collective attack, which is optimal for the DV QKD
protocols under given QBER [17].
We also consider the possibility for Alice and Bob to per-
form so-called preprocessing [17], allowing them to improve
the security of the generated key by deliberately adding some
noise to it before going to the stages of error correction and
privacy amplification. This technique can be seen as the DV
counterpart to the noise addition on the Bob’s side considered
in the CV case above in order to reduce the information which
is available to Eve.
In the case without preprocessing, the most general collec-
tive attacks performed by Eve on BB84 protocol can give her
IBB84EA = I
BB84
EB = H(Q) [17], where H(Q) is Shannon en-
tropy and Q represents the level of QBER measured by Alice
and Bob in their raw key. Since for the asymptotic case of
infinitely long key, which we assume here, the mutual infor-
mation between Alice and Bob when they are not performing
preprocessing stage can be written as IAB = 1 −H(Q) [35],
using equations (1) and (2) we can get the following expres-
sion for the lower bound on the secure key rate:
K(BB84) = pexpmax[0, 1− 2H(Q)]. (10)
On the other hand, the upper bound on the information Eve
can get by making the most general collective attacks when
Alice and Bob use six-state protocol can be written as [17]
I6stateEA = I
6state
EB = F (Q)−H(Q), (11)
where
F (Q) = −
(
1− 3Q
2
)
log2
(
1− 3Q
2
)
− 3Q
2
log2
Q
2
(12)
If so, then from (1) and (2) we get
K(6state) = pexpmax [0, 1− F (Q)] . (13)
The above formulae for K(BB84) and K(6state) get more
complicated, when Alice and Bob perform preprocessing,
which can be done e.g. by randomly flipping some bits of
5the raw key by Alice [17]. In this case the mutual information about the key shared by Alice and Bob transforms into
IAB(Q, x) = 1−H [(1− x)Q + x(1−Q)], (14)
where x is the probability for Alice to flip a given bit of the
raw key. In turn IBB84EA (which is still equal to I
BB84
EB ) can be
written as
IBB84EA (Q, x) = max
x∈[0,1/2]
min
λ∈[0,Q]
[
4∑
i=1
Ai log2 Ai − (1 + λ− 2Q) log2(1 + λ− 2Q)−
− 2(Q− λ) log2(Q− λ)− λ log2 λ] , (15)
where
A1,2 =
1−Q±
√
(1−Q)2 + 16x(1− x)(λ − 2Q+ 1)(λ−Q)
2
(16)
and
A3,4 =
Q±
√
Q2 + 16x(1− x)λ(λ −Q)
2
, (17)
while for six-state protocol we have
I6stateEA (Q, x) = max
x∈[0,1/2]
[
4∑
i=1
Bi log2Bi + F (Q)
]
, (18)
where
B1,2 =
1−Q±
√
(1 −Q)2 − 4x(1− x)Q(2 − 3Q)
2
(19)
and
B3,4 =
Q [1± (1 − 2x)]
2
. (20)
From the above analysis follows that the only parameter
which Alice and Bob have to estimate in order to be able
to assess the security of their DV QKD protocol is Q. We
will further express this quantity in terms of the parameters
of a given setup, taking into consideration the assumptions
that were made at the beginning of this section. To do so let
us first observe that since the scheme shown in Fig. 2 is per-
fectly symmetric in respect to polarizations, we don’t have
to consider separately the cases when Alice generates differ-
ently polarized photons. Instead of this, we can just consider
one single case, in which Alice emits single photon in a ran-
domly chosen polarization state, which we simply call right.
The orthogonal polarization state is called wrong in this situ-
ation. Similarly, we call the detector to which signal photon
emitted by Alice would go, if it is not lost during the propaga-
tion and if Bob chose the right basis for his measurement, the
right detector, and the other one – the wrong detector. Now by
p+(k, l) [p−(k, l)] let’s denote the probability that signal pho-
ton would [would not] arrive at the right detector in a given
attempt to generate a single bit of the key and at the same
time k noise photons would arrive at the right detector, while
l noise photons would arrive at the wrong detector. These two
quantities are equal to
p+(k, l) = Tpik(T )pil(T ) (21)
and
p−(k, l) = (1− T )pik(T )pil(T ), (22)
where
pik(T ) =
∞∑
n=k
pn(µ)
(
n
k
)
(1− T )kT n−k. (23)
Since we assume here that Bob’s detectors do not have
photon-number resolution, Alice and Bob automatically have
to accept every situation in which all of the photons leaving
the channel enter the same detector. Nevertheless, they can
discard from the generated key all of the cases when both
Bob’s detectors click at the same time (we call this kind of
event a double click here). If they do so, the expected proba-
bility for accepting a given event by users of six-state protocol
can be written as
pexp =
∞∑
k=0
p+(k, 0) +
∞∑
k=1
p−(k, 0) +
∞∑
l=1
p−(0, l). (24)
It is clear that only the last term in the above formula con-
tributes to the error rate, so the expression for QBER in our
model takes the following form:
Q =
∑∞
l=1 p−(0, l)
pexp
. (25)
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYTICAL
EXPRESSIONS
We now compare the security of the CV and DV QKD pro-
tocols in the presence of channel noise. To do so we per-
6form numerical calculations in order to find the dependency
of the maximal values of µ, for which it is possible to gener-
ate secure key, on the transmittance T of the channel connect-
ing Alice and Bob in the cases when they use different QKD
schemes. The relationships between such µDVmax(T ) functions
computed for BB84 and six-state protocols and the analogous
function µCVmax(T ) calculated for the squeezed-state scheme,
both for the basic scenario and for the case when Alice and
Bob try to improve the security of all these protocols by delib-
erately adding some noise to their raw keys (as was described
in Sec. II), are presented in Fig. 3.
Let us begin the analysis of Fig. 3 by focusing on the com-
parison between the six-state and squeezed-state protocols.
As we can see in this picture for relatively high values of T
the former of these two cryptographic schemes allows for sig-
nificantly higher values of µ than the latter one. However, this
advantage quickly vanishes when T decreases and for some
intermediate values of the transmittance of the channel con-
necting Alice and Bob squeezed-state protocol appears to be
slightly better suited for noisy quantum cryptography than the
six-state scheme. Nevertheless, when T decreases even fur-
ther, at some point six-state protocol again starts to outper-
form the squeezed-state scheme and its advantage growswhile
T → 0.
In fact, the relationship between BB84 and squeezed-state
protocols is also very similar to the one described above.
However, since for every value of T BB84 protocol happens to
be less resistant to the channel noise than the six-state scheme,
the region of channel transmittance for which squeezed-state
protocol allows for stronger channel noise than BB84 turns
out to be significantly larger than in the case of the comparison
between the six-state and squeezed-state protocols discussed
before. Also the relative advantage of the CV protocol in this
region is higher. In Fig. 3 we can also see that for the values
of T between roughly 10−0.5 and 10−2 adding noise to the
raw key by the legitimate participants of a given QKD proto-
col can be more profitable for squeezed-state protocol than for
DV protocols, while for T < 10−2 the situation is opposite.
Although it is not possible to find any simple, analytical
expressions for the functions µmax(T ) in the general case, the
analytical boundaries approximating it in the limit of T → 0
can be derived for every protocol of our interest.
Expression for DV QKD: Derivation of the boundary for
the case of six-state and BB84 protocols is relatively easy. To
do it, we observe that when T → 0 and µ → 0, the formula
for QBER can be easily transformed into
Q ≈ µ
2µ+ T
. (26)
If so, then for T ≪ 1 the maximal secure value of µ depends
on T as follows:
µmax(T ) =
TQth
1− 2Qth , (27)
whereQth is the threshold value of QBER, which for the cases
of six-state and BB84 protocols are approximately equal to
12.6% and 11% respectively [17].
BB84
six-state
FIG. 3. (color online) Ratios between maximal values of µ for which
it is possible to generate secure key using CV squeezed-state protocol
(µCVmax) and both DV protocols (µ
DV
max) considered in our analysis,
plotted as a function of channel transmission T for the situation when
Alice and Bob perform the randomization stage of their raw key in
order to increase its security (dashed lines) or do not perform it (solid
lines).
Expression for CV QKD: In the case of the squeezed-state
CV QKD protocol, when no noise is deliberately added on the
receiver side, the analytical lower bound on the secure key rate
can be simplified to
K(CV ) ≈ (T − µ) log2 e+ µ log2 µ, (28)
by using series expansion around T = 0, taking the limit of
infinite modulation V →∞ and performing series expansion
around µ = 0. The value of µ which turns this simplified ex-
pression to zero can be calculated analytically and expressed
using Lambert W function as
µmax(T ) = exp[1 +W−1(−T/e)]. (29)
The comparison between the boundaries given by formulae
(27) and (29) and the results of our numerical calculations of
the functions µmax(T ) performed for the cases of six-state
and squeezed-state protocols, which is illustrated in Fig. 4,
shows good agreement between our analytical and numerical
results in the limit of T → 0.
While our main goal in performing the analysis presented
above was to identify the conditions in which only one of
the two main families of QKD protocols can be used to pro-
vide security for the process of key generation, its results can-
not help us with answering the question which protocol one
should choose in a particular case when both CV and DV
QKD schemes can be secure at the same time. Facing such a
decision it is always good to compare the lower bounds for the
secure key rate for different protocols. This kind of compar-
ison, performed for the six-state and squeezed-state schemes,
is presented in Fig. 5 where the function of K(T ) was plot-
ted for a few different values of µ, ranging from 10−5 to 0.5.
Although typical values of µ in a dark fiber, dedicated solely
for the generation of secret key, can be estimated to be on
the level of 10−4–10−5 (basing on the experimental results
obtained in [12]), in commercial QKD applications utilizing
7FIG. 4. (color online) Maximal values of µ for which it is possi-
ble to generate secure key as a function of channel transmittance T
calculated numerically (solid lines) for the cases of Alice and Bob us-
ing six-state protocol (red lines) and squeezed-state protocol (black
lines), plotted along with the analytical approximations (dot-dashed
lines) of the functions µmax(T ) valid for the case of T → 0, given
by formulae (27) and (29) respectively.
telecom fibers populated by strong classical signals the chan-
nel noise can be considerably stronger. In this situation the
actual level of µ would primarily depend on the number of
classical channels multiplexed in a given fiber and the power
of classical signals transmitted through them [34]. For this
reason in the analysis presented in this paper we decided not
to focus on a particular level of µ, but consider a broad range
of its values, encompassing several orders of magnitude.
From the Fig. 5 one can conclude that if only T is consider-
ably larger than the minimal secure transmittance of the chan-
nel connecting Alice and Bob for CV squeezed-state proto-
col, this scheme can always provide comparable but slightly
higher lower bound on the secure key rate than the six-state
DV QKD protocol. Similar conclusion can be drawn from the
comparison of BB84 and squeezed-state schemes. The main
reason for this advantage stems from the capability of encod-
ing more than one bit of information in a single pulse by using
CV QKD protocols, which in turn is impossible for the con-
sidered DV schemes based on qubits. The results presented
in Fig. 5 can be also used to predict the outcome of a possible
comparison of the robustness of the six-state and squeezed-
state protocols to the channel noise for a given non-zero value
of K . In this case one should just compare the minimal se-
cure values of T for these protocols, which can be reached for
different levels of µ for a desired K . It is important to note,
however, that the lower bound on the secure key rate in our
work is calculated per use of the channel, so it contains only
partial information on the achievable rate of a particular im-
plementation of a given QKD protocol. In order to calculate
the lower bound on the amount of bits of the final key per unit
of time, one would have to multiply the expression forK (for-
mula (1) or (3) for the DV or CV protocols respectively) by
the repetition rate of the system, which depends on the setup.
Therefore comparing the key rates in the general case can be
misleading.
FIG. 5. (color online) Lower bound for the secure key rate as a func-
tion of transmittance of the channel connecting Alice and Bob, plot-
ted for µ = 0.5 (red lines), µ = 10−1 (orange lines), µ = 10−2
(yellow lines), µ = 10−3 (green lines), µ = 10−4 (blue lines)
and µ = 10−5 (black lines) for six-state protocol (solid lines) and
squeezed-state protocol (dashed lines) with the assumption that Al-
ice’s sources and Bob’s detection systems are perfect.
The analysis presented abovewas performed for the asymp-
totic case of infinite number of quantum signals exchanged by
Alice and Bob during the key generation process. However, in
realistic situation this number, denoted here by N , is always
finite. Therefore, it is instructive to check the stability of the
discussed results in the finite-key regime. In order to do that
we utilize the calculation method introduced for the DV QKD
case in [20] and adopted for the CV protocols in [21]. For
definiteness we set the values of all of the failure probabilities
present in the mathematical formulas introduced there to the
level of 10−10. The results of this calculation are illustrated in
Fig. 6, where the ratio of µCVmax/µ
DV
max for squeezed-state and
six-state protocols is plotted for different numbers of N .
As it turns out, if only the transmittance of the quantum
channel connecting Alice and Bob is not particularly high,
the finite-size effects have more negative influence on the
squeezed-state protocol than on the DV schemes. In partic-
ular, for any finite N there exists a corresponding threshold
value for T below which generation of secure key by utilizing
squeezed-state protocol becomes impossible even for µ → 0.
On the other hand, as long as the lossy and noisy channel con-
necting Alice and Bob is the only imperfect setup element,
no such threshold appears for the DV protocols. Therefore,
for limited N the ratio of µCVmax/µ
DV
max decreases much faster
and eventually reaches zero, contrary to the asymptotic case.
Furthermore, Fig. 6 shows that the value of T , below which
six-state protocol becomes more resistant to the channel noise
than a given CV QKD scheme, grows with the decreasing
number of quantum signals exchanged by Alice and Bob.
IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR NONCLASSICAL RESOURCES
Knowing that for the case when Alice’s source and Bob’s
detection system are perfect DV QKD protocols can provide
8FIG. 6. (color online) Ratio between maximal values of µ for which
it is possible to generate secure key using squeezed-state protocol
(µCVmax) and six-state protocol (µ
DV
max), plotted as a function of chan-
nel transmittance T for the asymptotic case in which the number of
quantum signals exchanged by Alice and Bob during the protocol is
infinite (solid line) and for the situations when it equals toN = 1010
(dashed line),N = 108 (dot-dashed line) andN = 106 (dotted line).
The calculations were made with the assumption that the trusted par-
ties do not increase the security of their raw key by performing the
randomization stage.
one with the security of key generation process for slightly
higher values of µ than the squeezed-state CV protocol if only
the transmittance of the channel connecting Alice and Bob is
low enough, we can now consider the possibility for realizing
this kind of scenario in the situation when the sources of signal
owned by Alice are not ideal.
In order to assess the quality of a single-photon source
needed for secure realization of QKD protocols for the combi-
nations of parameters T and µ for which squeezed-state pro-
tocol is insecure, we will assume in this section that Alice’s
source produces genuine single-photon pulses with probabil-
ity p and empty pulses with probability 1−p, i.e. it never emits
multiphoton pulses. The reason for adopting this particular
model of Alice’s source for our considerations is that while
decreasing the probability for multiphoton emission to a very
low level is possible these days for many different kinds of
realistic single-photon sources [45–47], constructing a high-
quality source which would produce non-empty pulses with
probability close to one remains a serious challenge for exper-
imental physicists. This task is especially hard to be accom-
plished for the case of deterministic single-photon sources,
which are usually affected by poor collection efficiency of
generated photons [48]. However, very promising sources
based on quantum dots embedded in photonic nanowires or
micropillar cavities have been developed recently, with prob-
ability of producing a single-photon pulse exceeding 70% and
potentially reaching even 95% [47, 49, 50]. Furthermore,
relatively efficient probabilistic single-photon sources, based
especially on the spontaneous parametric down-conversion
(SPDC) process, with very low probabilities of emitting a
multiphoton pulse and with the heralding efficiency exceed-
ing 60%were already developedmore than a decade ago [45].
Nowadays, reports on SPDC-based sources with p > 80% can
FIG. 7. (color online) Requirements on the value of squeezing pa-
rameter (dashed lines) and the probability p of producing non-empty
signal pulse by a single-photon source (solid lines) needed to be
reached for the security of, respectively, the squeezed-state proto-
col and a) six-state, b) BB84 protocol, plotted as functions of the
transmittance of the channel connecting Alice and Bob for six dif-
ferent values of µ: µ = 0.5 (red lines), µ = 10−1 (orange lines),
µ = 10−2 (yellow lines), µ = 10−3 (green lines), µ = 10−4 (blue
lines) and µ = 10−5 (black lines). Vertical dotted lines denote the
values of T for which squeezed-state protocol becomes insecure for
particular values of µ.
be find in the literature [51].
Adopting the model for realistic single-photon source de-
scribed above, we investigated the dependence of the minimal
probability p of producing non-empty pulse by Alice’s source,
required for the six-state and BB84 protocols to be secure, on
the transmittance of the channel connecting Alice and Bob for
a few different values of the power of the source of noise in the
DVQKDmodel, illustrated in Fig. 2. The results of this inves-
tigation are plotted in Fig. 7. In the same figure we also plotted
the dependency of the value of squeezing parameter, required
for the security of the squeezed-state protocol in the model
for CV QKD pictured in Fig. 1, on T . In order to make neces-
sary calculations for squeezed-state protocol in realistic case
we used the generalized state preparation model for CV QKD
in which modulation and squeezing of the states emitted by
Alice’s source can be parametrized separately [52]. While the
plots given in Fig. 7 were obtained for the very strong mod-
9FIG. 8. (color online) Requirements on the probability p of pro-
ducing non-empty signal pulse by a single-photon source needed to
be fulfilled for the generation of secure key by using six-state (red,
dashed line) or BB84 (blue, solid line) protocol for the same value
of µ, for which squeezed-state protocol with infinite squeezing stops
being secure at a given transmittance T .
ulation variance (103 shot-noise units), varying this quantity
does not significantly affect the results.
From Fig. 7 one can deduce that the requirements for the
probability p of emitting non-empty pulse by Alice’s single-
photon source, which would have to be fulfilled in order to
ensure security of the DV QKD protocols for the values of T
for which squeezed-state protocol is no longer secure, are gen-
erally quite demanding, especially if the power of the source
of noise is relatively high. For different levels of µ the mini-
mal values of p which would be needed to realize this task are
given by the crossing points of the solid and dotted lines of the
same colors displayed in Fig. 7. While in practice overcom-
ing the squeezed-state protocol by the DV QKD schemes may
be very hard or even impossible to demonstrate for relatively
high values of µ, it is certainly achievable for realistic sources
in the case of µ≪ 1, as the requirements for p shown in Fig. 7
becomemore and more relaxed when µ→ 0. This conclusion
can be confirmed in Fig. 8, where the minimal required values
of p are plotted as the functions of µ both for the BB84 and
six-state protocol. The results of our analysis shown in Fig. 7
and Fig. 8 indicate that even DV QKD schemes with ineffi-
cienct sources of photons can be capable to overcome the CV
protocols for long-distance quantum cryptography with ultra
low channel noise.
Not surprisingly, in Fig. 8 one can also see that for every
level of µ the value of p needed to overcome squeezed-state
protocol is larger for the BB84 than for the six-state proto-
col. This means that a demonstration of the superiority of
the six-state protocol over the squeezed-state scheme in real-
istic situation would be easier to perform than an analogous
demonstration for BB84 protocol. This conclusion justifies
our choice to focus more on the six-state protocol in this work,
despite much larger popularity of the BB84 scheme.
While Fig. 8 shows only the minimal values of p for which
DV QKD protocols can still be secure for given µ and T
FIG. 9. (color online) Minimal values of the probability p of pro-
ducing non-empty signal pulse by a single-photon source, needed
for the six-state protocol to be secure for a given pair of values of
the channel transmittance T and noise mean photon number µ for
which squeezed-state protocol is already insecure. White color indi-
cates the regions of the plot where either the squeezed-state protocol
is still secure or the six-state protocol is insecure even for p = 1.
that already breaks the security of the CV QKD schemes, for
higher p demonstrating the superiority of BB84 or six-state
protocol over the squeezed-state scheme may be realized also
for the lower transmittance of the quantum channel connect-
ing Alice and Bob. Therefore, it is reasonable to ask about
the whole region of parameters µ and T for which overcom-
ing the performance of the squeezed-state protocol by a given
DV QKD scheme is possible. Such a region, found for the
case of six-state protocol, is illustrated in Fig. 9. One can see
there that it is relatively narrow. This is because the closer T
is to the minimal secure transmittance of the quantum channel
connectingAlice and Bob for a given µ, the faster the minimal
required value of p goes to one. This tendency could actually
be observed even before, in Fig. 7. Fig. 9 also confirms that
the requirement for p relaxes when µ→ 0.
Beside sources of photons, another fundamental part of the
setup needed for the implementation of DV QKD protocols
are single-photon detectors. In some situations imperfection
of these devices can also affect the security of such schemes
in significant way. In particular, every realistic single-photon
detector is characterized by a non-zero dark count rate. The
influence of these unwanted clicks on the results presented
in this work is negligible as long as the value of T is more
than two orders of magnitude higher than the probability d to
register a dark count per single detection window. However,
for lower transmittance of the quantum channel dark counts
considerably affect the security of DV QKD protocols and
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can become the major issue. They result in threshold val-
ues of channel transmittance Tth, below which overcoming
squeezed-state protocol with DV schemes becomes impossi-
ble even if the single-photon source used by Alice is perfect.
These thresholds strongly depend on the relationship between
d and the detection efficiency η of the measurement devices
utilized by Bob. Typical values of d/η that can be found in
the literature describing recent DV QKD experiments range
from 10−4 to 10−7 [53]. During our work we found out that
in this region Tth can be upper-bounded by
T 6stateth ≤ 101.07 log10(d/η)+1.45 (30)
for the case when the trusted parties implement six-state pro-
tocol or
TBB84th ≤ 101.15 log10(d/η)+2.12. (31)
when they choose BB84 scheme.
On the other hand, if Bob’s measurement system does not
register any dark counts, the limited detection efficiency does
not affect the results of our calculations as long as T < 10−2.
This is because for low values of T almost all of the non-
empty pulses arriving at Bob’s measurement system contain
either a single signal photon or a single noise photon. There-
fore, since the limited detection efficiency reduces the frac-
tions of registered signal and noise photons in exactly the
same way its value does not matter for the security thresh-
old. Only when the transmittance of the quantum channel
connecting Alice and Bob is relatively high and the probabil-
ity for more photons to arrive at Bob’s detectors at the same
time becomes significant, the situation can be different. In
this case limited detection efficiency makes the requirement
for the quality of Alice’s source slightly more demanding.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the analysis presented above we compared the security
of two DV protocols, namely BB84 and six-state, and CV
squeezed-state protocol in the situation when the only im-
perfect element of the setup used by Alice and Bob is the
quantum channel connecting them. We assumed here that this
channel is lossy and that the noise coupled to the signal during
its propagation through it is of the type of thermal reservoir,
which can be seen as a typical scenario for CV QKD case.
The results of our analysis, depicted in Fig. 3, clearly show
that while for some intermediate values of the channel trans-
mittance continuous-variable squeezed-state protocol is com-
parably resilient to the channel noise as BB84 and six-state
schemes, for the cases of T → 1 and T ≪ 1 both the DV
protocols perform better. It suggests that in the scenario when
Alice and Bob have high-quality sources and detectors, but
the quantum channel connecting them is lossy and noisy, DV
QKD technique can be seen as having more potential for gen-
erating a secure cryptographic key than CV QKD. Although
exploiting this potential in practice may be challenging, it is
within our reach. With the recent engineering progress in
the field of single-photon sources it can be even possible to
FIG. 10. (color online) Ratios between maximal values of µ for
which it is possible to generate secure key using CV GG02 proto-
col (µCVmax) and both DV protocols (µ
DV
max) considered in our analy-
sis, plotted as a function of channel transmission T for the situation
when Alice and Bob perform the randomization stage of their raw
key in order to increase its security (dashed lines) or do not perform
it (solid lines).
demonstrate the superiority of realistic DV protocols over the
infinite-squeezing ideal CV schemes in the regime of T ≪ 1,
as can be seen in Fig. 7. This conclusion may provide some
additional motivation for the experimental physicists to focus
even more of their efforts on developing novel high-quality
sources with high probability of producing non-empty pulse
and very low probability for multiphoton emission or improv-
ing the performance of the existing ones.
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Appendix A
In the main body of our paper we considered Gaussian
squeezed-state CV QKD protocol, using it for the comparison
with DV QKD protocols in terms of their robustness to the
channel noise. However, due to the popularity of the GG02
scheme based on coherent states [6], it is meaningful to per-
form a similar analysis also for this protocol. In order to do
all the necessary calculations in this situation, one can once
again utilize the formulae introduced in Sec. II A, only assum-
ing that this time the variance of the signal states is V = 1.
In Fig. 10 we present the results of our comparison between
the maximal values of the parameter µ ensuring the security
of GG02 and the DV QKD protocols. This comparison is sim-
ilar to the one made for the squeezed-state scheme in Sec. III,
which results are depicted in Fig. 3. By comparing the two
aforementioned figures with each other one can confirm that
the squeezed-state protocol is indeed more resistant to the
channel noise than the GG02 scheme, as was already stated
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in the first paragraph of Sec. II A. As can be seen in Fig.10,
contrary to the case of the squeezed-state protocol, for every
possible value of T , GG02 scheme allows for significantly
lower values of µmax than the BB84 and six-state protocols.
Appendix B
In the analysis of DV QKD protocols presented in the main
body of this article we assumed that Bob’s detectors have per-
fect detection efficiency, but do not have the ability to resolve
the number of photons entering them. At first sight it would
seem that replacing them with photon-number-resolving de-
tectors should improve the setup, making it more resilient to
the channel noise. However this intuition does not necessarily
has to be correct. Here we are going to show that in our model,
when the source of channel noise has thermal statistics, equip-
ping Bob’s detectors with photon-number resolution does not
change the function of µDVmax(T ) in any way, while for Poisson
statistics it can even have negative effect on QKD security.
In order to accomplish this task, we will start with adapting
the expressions for pexp and Q, given previously by formu-
lae (24) and (25) respectively, to the case of photon-number-
resolving detetcors used by Bob. We get:
p(II)exp = p+(0, 0) + p−(1, 0) + p−(0, 1) (B1)
and
Q(II) =
p−(0, 1)
p
(II)
exp
. (B2)
Since for both DV protocols considered here the formulae for
∆I depend only on the parameter Q (and optinally the prob-
ability x to flip a bit by Alice, if the preprocessing stage is
being performed), it is obvious that the condition for photon-
number-resolving detectors to offer better security of our DV
QKD schemes than simple on/off binary detectors can be writ-
ten in the form of the following inequality:
Q(II) < Q. (B3)
Using equations (25) and (B2), and taking advantage of the
facts that
p+(k, l) = p+(l, k) (B4)
and
p−(k, l) =
1− T
T
p+(k, l), (B5)
we can transfrom this condition into
p+(1, 0) ·
∞∑
k=1
p+(k, 0) < p+(0, 0) ·
∞∑
k=2
p+(k, 0). (B6)
After inserting (21) and performing some algebraic calcula-
tions, we can get the following final version of this condition:
∞∑
k=1
∞∑
n=k
∞∑
m=1
[
pn(µ)pm(µ)m
(
n
k
)
− (B7)
− pn+1(µ)pm−1(µ)
(
n+ 1
k + 1
)]
(1− T )kT n+m−k−1 < 0.
FIG. 11. (color online) Maximal values of µ for which it is possible
to generate secure key as a function of channel transmission T plot-
ted for the case of Alice and Bob using six-state protocol when the
channel noise has thermal statistics and the detectors used by Bob
have photon-number-resolving ability (dashed blue line) or do not
have it (solid red line). Analogous results for the Poissonian type
of noise are plotted with dashed green line (for detectors with pho-
ton number resolution) and solid orange line (for detectors without
photon number resolution).
The above inequality cannot be solved analytically in the
general case. However, it can be further simplified in two
extreme cases of T → 0 and T → 1. If T → 0, we can leave
only the expression for m = 1 and n = k on the left-hand
side of the condition (B8). If we do it, we get:
∞∑
k=1
[pk(µ)p1(µ)− pk+1(µ)p0(µ)] < 0, (B8)
But for the thermal statistics we have
pk(µ)p1(µ) − pk+1(µ)p0(µ) = 0 (B9)
for every k. This means that equipping Bob’s detectors with
the ability to resolve the number of incoming photons does
not have any effect on the function µmax(T ) when T → 0.
The situation for T → 1 is more complicated. In this case
we can leave on the left-hand side of inequality (B8) only the
expression with lowest possible power of (1 − T ), that is for
k = 1. Then we have
∞∑
n,m=1
[
nmpn(µ)pm(µ)−
(
n+ 1
2
)
pn+1(µ)pm−1(µ)
]
< 0.
(B10)
For thermal statistics of the source of noise this condition be-
comes
∞∑
n,m=1
µn+m
(µ+ 1)n+m+2
n
[
m− n+ 1
2
]
< 0. (B11)
A good method to prove that the left hand side of this inequal-
ity is equal to zero is to show that for any c the term standing
beside µc/(µ+ 1)(c+2), which can be actually written as
c−1∑
n=1
n
[
c− n− n+ 1
2
]
, (B12)
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is equal to zero. This can be done by induction.
On the other hand for Poisson statistics of the sources of
noise, inequality (B8) would transform into
∞∑
k=1
e−2µµk+1
[
1
k!
− 1
(k + 1)!
]
< 0 (B13)
for the case of T → 0 or into
∞∑
n,m=1
e−2µ
µn+m
2(n− 1)!(m− 1)! < 0 (B14)
for the case of T → 1. It is not difficult to see, that the left-
hand sides of both these inequalities are actually larger than
zero, which means that if the sources of noise in our DV QKD
scheme had Poisson statistics, from the point of its resilience
to noise it would be better for Bob to use simple on/off detec-
tors instead of photon-number-resolving ones.
The conclusions which can be drawn from the above anal-
ysis can be confirmed in Fig. 11, where we present the results
of the numerical calculations of the function µDVmax(T ) for the
cases of thermal and Poisson statistics of the source of noise
both in the situation when Bob uses detectors with and without
the ability to resolve the number of photons entering them.
In fact, it is quite easy to intuitively explain why using
photon-number-resolving detectors by Bob does not seem to
improve the security of our DV QKD scheme over the case
of on/off detectors. The basic reason for this is that detec-
tors with photon-number resolution exclude from the key not
only all the situations in which more than one photon comes
to the wrong detector (which is obviously good for the secu-
rity), but also all the cases when more than one photon arrives
in the right detector (which is obviously bad). So although us-
ing photon-number-resolving detectors reduces the number of
errors in the key, QBER given by the formula (25) can actu-
ally increase due to even greater reduction of pexp at the same
time.
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